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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Respondents contend that Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is determinative to this appeal• That statute is set 
forth verbatim as follows: 
New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for 
a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of 
the court, jury or adverse party, or any order 
of the court, or abuse of discretion by which 
either party was prevented from having a fair 
trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever 
any one or more of the jurors have been 
induced to assent to any general or special 
verdict, or to a finding on any question 
submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of 
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material 
for the party making the application, which he 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceeding 
This case arose out of an automobile accident which 
occurred on or about May 25, 1988 in Utah County. The Appellant 
filed a Complaint on July 11, 1990. A four-day trial commenced on 
April 27, 1992. At the trial's conclusion, the jury returned a 
verdict that the Respondents were not the proximate cause of any 
damages complained of by Appellant. Appellant's motion for a new 
trial was denied, and Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on August 
5, 1992. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Appellant was involved in an automobile accident on 
May 25, 1988. (R 354 p. 93) 
2. The Appellant suffered from numerous pre-existing 
physical conditions as set forth below: 
A. Pre-existing knee problems 
(1) In the fall of 1985, approximately two and a half 
(2-1/2) years before the accident, Jeanne Greenwood, a 
neighbor of Steven Davis in Highland, Utah, observed Mr. Davis 
run "stiff-legged." She also observed him "running like he 
was hurt." (R 354 pp. 729-730) 
(2) At the time of the aforementioned observation, Mrs. 
Greenwood was talking to the wife of the Appellant, Mrs. 
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Davis, and inquired, "what is the matter with Steve?" 
[Appellant] Mrs. Davis responded, "he has got bad knees." 
She also stated, "he needs to have them operated on." (R 354, 
p. 730) 
(3) Mrs. Davis further remarked that her husband could 
not compete with her brothers playing basketball because of 
his knees. (R 354, p. 730) 
(4) In addition, Jerold Greenwood, the husband of Jeanne 
Greenwood, testified that in the fall of 1985, he played 
basketball with Mr. Davis on one occasion. He saw Mr. Davis 
wearing "two heavy knee braces," and observed that Mr. Davis 
looked "like someone who had two bad knees." (R 354, pp. 738-
739) 
(5) Dr. Gary F. Larsen, one of Appellant's treating 
orthopedic physicians, saw Steven Davis for knee problems on 
April 9, 1984, approximately four (4) years before the 
accident. (R 354, pp. 762-764) 
(6) During the examination, Mr. Davis complained that he 
had experienced problems in both knees for approximately six 
(6) years, dating back to 1978. (R 354, p. 764) 
(7) The history taken by Dr. Larsen showed that the 
problems with Appellant's knees included swelling, pain, 
stiffness and the knees slipping out of place. (R 354, p. 
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765) 
(8) As part of the examination, Dr. Larsen conducted a 
lateral pivot shift test for both knees. His conclusion was 
that Mr. Davis had chronically torn anterior cruciate 
ligaments of both knees. (R 354, pp. 765-766) 
(9) Further, Dr. Larsen also concluded that Mr. Davis 
had irritation over the menisci of both knees which suggested 
a torn meniscus. (R 354, pp. 765-767) 
(10) Dr. Larsen informed Mr. Davis that he felt that both 
knees needed to be operated on and he suggested that he give 
up basketball. (R 354, p. 769) 
(11) Dr. Thomas Rosenberg, another treating orthopedic 
physician, testified that Steven Davis had ligament 
insufficiency and the cartilage which existed were before the 
automobile accident. (R 354, p. 415) 
(12) Douglas Davis, the Appellant's brother who is a 
chiropractor, noted in his records of November 1983 that 
Steven Davis sustained injury to his leg when he ran into 
another player playing basketball. The diagnosis indicated 
pain to the knee joint. (R 354, pp. 389-390.) 
(13) Appellant's wife testified that before the accident, 
she recalled him occasionally complaining of problems with his 
knees. (R 354, p. 518) 
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B. Pre-existing back problems 
(1) Prior to the automobile accident of May 25 1988, Mr. 
Davis had been seen by chiropractors on at least sixty nine 
(69) occasions, as shown by Trial Exhibit 80, attached hereto 
in the Addendum of this brief. (R 354 Plaintiff's Exhibit 80) 
(2) After the automobile accident of May 25, 1988, Mr. 
Davis was given the following diagnosis by his brother, 
Douglas Davis, a chiropractor: 
Severe sprain/strain to the cervical 
and upper thoracic regions with 
radiculitis into the cervical and 
brachial plexus.11 (R 354, pp. 378-
379) 
(3) Douglas Davis testified that this diagnosis was a 
permanent condition and that a person would never be the same 
after this type of injury. (R 354, pp. 379-380) 
(4) The identical diagnosis, word-for-word, was made by 
Douglas Davis on November 22, 1978, approximately ten (10) 
years earlier, after Steven Davis injured his back while 
lifting boxes from the garage to the basement. (R 354, p. 
381) 
(5) Again, Douglas Davis gave the identical diagnosis to 
Steven Davis approximately a year later, on October 25, 1979, 
when Steven Davis injured his back while moving cases and 
boxes at the University of Utah. (R 354, p. 387) 
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(6) Steven Davis told Dr. Charles Smith, an orthopedic 
physician who performed an independent examination on 
Appellant that he had injured his right knee twenty (20) years 
earlier, which would have been approximately 1971. (R 354, p. 
473) 
(7) Dr. Smith testified that the surgery performed by 
Dr. Rosenberg was not related to the automobile accident. (R 
354, p. 475) 
(8) Dr. Smith also testified that a typical rear-end 
collision with forces between 10 and 15 miles an hour would 
not have caused Appellant's torn meniscus. (R 354, pp. 479-
780) 
(9) Finally, it was Dr. Smith's opinion that the 
automobile accident caused a strain on Appellant's knee and 
that Mr. Davis would have recovered or returned to his pre-
injury condition within two or three months after the 
accident. (R 354, p. 482) 
(10) Dr. Smith did not agree with the findings of 
chiropractor Douglas Davis that there was radiculitis in the 
brachium, radiculitis in the thoracic spine or radiculitis in 
the lumbar spine. If such were the case, Dr. Smith testified 
that Steven Davis could not have walked into his office in an 
upright condition. (R 354, p. 484) 
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(12) In reviewing Mr. Davis' CT scans, Dr. Smith did not 
see any abnormality that he would attribute to the automobile 
accident. (R 354, p. 485) 
(13) Dr. Smith stated that the only unusual findings on 
the CT scans would have been caused by age, not trauma. (R 
354, p. 485) 
(14) Dr. Halverson, the treating radiologist for 
Appellant, testified that he could not say with reasonable 
medical certainty that any findings in Appellant's CT scans 
were caused by the automobile accident. (R 354, pp. 462-464) 
C. Pre-existing psychological and emotional problems 
(1) Although Dr. Ralph Gant testified that the 
automobile accident aggravated a pre-existing Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder and caused Post Concussion Syndrome, Dr. Gant 
admitted that the major source of stress on Mr. Davis' life 
was an unrelated adoption problem. Dr. Gant also admitted 
that there were numerous other sources of stress on 
Appellant's life which were unrelated to the accident. These 
include investigations of Mr. Davis by the SBA and FBI, an 
adoption problem, several pending lawsuits to which Mr. Davis 
was a party, problems with religious leaders, a gunshot wound 
to the head, a discrimination claim Mr. Davis made against a 
college professor, being arrested and jailed, and the imminent 
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loss of his home. Additionally, Dr. Gant admitted that he 
referred Appellant to a neuropsychologist, Dr. Linda Gummow, 
for additional testing. (R 354, pp. 617-651) 
(2) Appellants neuropsychological expert, Dr. Linda 
Gummow, testified that she could not say with any degree of 
medical certainty that Appellant suffered a concussion as a 
result of the subject accident. (R 354, p. 722) 
(3) Additionally, Dr. Gummow testified that the basis 
for her opinion that the subject accident aggravated the pre-
existing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder was the patient's 
statement to her that the accident caused orthopedic injuries, 
restricting his ability to exercise as he did in the past, 
thus prohibiting Appellant from engaging in stress-relieving 
physical activities. Dr. Gummow testified that she could only 
assume Appellant's statements in this regard were true as she 
had no personal knowledge on the subject. (R 354, pp. 720-
721) 
(4) Dr. Michael Lambert, an expert psychologist, who was 
not retained by either party in the instant case, but by the 
State of Utah to determine Appellant's eligibility for 
educational benefits, testified that after examining and 
testing Appellant in a manner similar to Drs. Gant and Gummow, 
it was his opinion that Appellant was exaggerating his 
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psychological symptoms to maximize his recovery in pending 
litigation, and that he wanted to appear more disturbed than 
he was. (R 354, pp. 815-816) 
D. Pre-existing TMJ problems 
(1) Respondent John Porter testified that, although he 
was traveling about 10 mph at the point he impacted 
Appellant's vehicle, the impact was a glancing blow as he 
swerved to his right before impact. (R 354, p. 804) (emphasis 
added) 
(2) Respondent Karl Weenig testified that he was 
following Appellant's and respondent Porter's vehicles, and 
when he saw Appellant's vehicle stop and respondent Porter's 
vehicle swerve to the right, he swerved to the left and 
applied his brakes. Respondent Weenig testified that the 
right rear portion of his vehicle struck the left rear corner 
of Appellant's vehicle, then glanced off. (R 354, p. 745) 
(3) Respondents' expert accident reconstructionist, Greg 
DuVal, testified that the two (2) impacts made by Respondents' 
vehicles were very similar, both in kind and degree. (R 354, 
pp. 781-782) 
(4) Mr. DuVal testified that in his opinion the forward 
travel speed of each vehicle at the point of impact was 1-15 
mph, but because each impact was a glancing blow, the impact 
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directed to Appellant's vehicle was only 3-4 mph. (R 354, p. 
782) 
(5) Mr. DuVal testified that in his opinion, the effect 
of each impact upon Appellant's body inside Appellant's 
vehicle was similar to the type of bump which children receive 
when riding the bumper cars at an amusement park. (R 354, p. 
790-791) 
(6) Although Dr. Keith Whatcott opined that there was a 
causal relation between the instant automobile accident and a 
condition which he diagnosed in Appellant as Temporal 
Mandibular Disorder, Dr. Whatcott admitted that he saw 
Appellant on only one occasion, over two years after the 
accident occurred. (R 354, pp. 310, 327) 
(7) Dr. Whatcott admitted that the only diagnostic 
procedures he employed in reaching his conclusions were 
palpating or massaging some of the muscles on Appellant's face 
and neck and observing how Appellant opened and closed his 
jaw. He did not place Appellant on any diagnostic equipment 
nor take any x-rays. (R 354, p. 316) 
(8) Respondents' dental expert, Dr. Crayton Walker, 
testified that when he examined Appellant, he took x-rays, 
examined and tested Appellant's teeth, muscles, joints and 
inquired regarding Appellant's psychological history. (R 354, 
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pp. 564-567) 
(9) Dr. Walker testified that he clinically examined 
Appellant's teeth and the x-rays, and the examination showed 
that Appellant's teeth showed facets of wear. (R 354, pp. 
565-566) 
(10) It was Dr. Walker's opinion that after examining the 
facets of wear, that they were caused by Appellant grinding 
his teeth. Further, it was Dr. Walker's opinion that 
Appellant had been grinding his teeth for most of his adult 
life. (R 354, pp. 568-569) 
(11) It was Dr. Walker's opinion that there was no causal 
connection between the accident and any of the Temporal 
Mandibular abnormalities which he found or of which Appellant 
complained. (R 354, pp. 580-581) 
(12) Dr. Walker testified that he was familiar with Dr. 
Whatcott's report and gave his opinion that, based upon the 
cursory examination and diagnostic procedures employed by Dr. 
Whatcott, Dr. Whatcott could not give an opinion with any 
degree of reasonable medical certainty that Appellant even 
suffered from Temporal Mandibular Disorder. (R 354, pp. 580-
581) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant has no legal or factual basis to challenge the 
jury's verdict. Given Appellant's complete failure to marshall the 
evidence that supported the verdict, his challenge to the verdict's 
validity must be rejected. 
The trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for a 
new trial because the verdict was supported by competent evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY VERDICT. 
Appellant's primary argument on appeal is that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict.1 It is well 
established in Utah law that a jury verdict will not be disturbed 
if there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Crookston 
v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). In the 
present case, Respondents contend that there was not only 
sufficient evidence to support a verdict, but there was 
overwhelming evidence to support the jury verdict. 
Appellant argues that there was sufficient evidence to 
1The jury determined that Respondents were negligent, but that 
their negligence did not proximately cause Appellant's injuries, (R 
345, pp. 268-70) This factual finding is consistent with the law. 
See, e.g.. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co.. 701 P.2d 
1078, 1083 (Utah 1985) ("certainly there is no inconsistency 
between findings of negligence and no proximate cause.11) 
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show that his back, knee, TMJ and psychological injuries were 
caused by the accident. On the other hand, Respondents assert that 
there was sufficient evidence to show exactly the opposite—that 
Appellant's injuries were not caused by the accident. In this 
connection, the Appellant has the burden of establishing a prima 
facie case that Respondents' negligence was the proximate cause of 
Appellant's harm. Wessell v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 
250-253, (Utah 1985). The jury was not convinced that Appellant 
had carried his burden. There is no basis to question that factual 
determination. 
Appellant is requesting that the court take a small 
portion of the evidence; consider it in the light most favorable to 
him; draw all inferences in his favor; and ignore all of the 
rebutting, explaining and countering evidence. In effect, 
Appellant is seeking to have the court disregard much of the 
evidence presented at trial. Appellant's argument must be 
rejected. As he recognizes in his brief, Appellant "must marshall 
the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that 
the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict.ff Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799. 
Clearly, Appellant has failed to make the necessary 
showing. He has not listed any evidence that supports the verdict. 
Rather, he has merely attempted to refute the credibility of the 
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evidence which supported the verdict and rely on other, 
contradictory evidence that supports his position. Appellant's 
argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new 
trial has no legal basis given his complete failure to marshall the 
evidence. 
Overwhelming evidence was presented at trial which 
supports the jury's verdict. The evidence in support of the 
Respondents' position is set forth as follows: 
(a) Evidence of knee problems 
The record is replete with evidence that Appellant had 
pre-existing knee problems. First, the Greenwoods, neighbors of 
Mr. Davis, testified as to observing the knee problems of Mr. Davis 
back in 1985. Mrs. Greenwood was also told by Mrs. Davis that 
Steven Davis had knee problems and needed an operation. 
The testimony of Dr. Larsen, one of Appellant's treating 
physicians, confirms that Mr. Davis had major knee problems as 
early as April 9, 1984. Mr. Davis had complained of knee problems 
which had troubled him for a period of six (6) years, dating back 
to 1978. Dr. Larsen, after examining Mr. Davis, diagnosed a torn 
anterior ligament cruciate in both knees and a torn meniscus. 
Based on his finding, Dr. Larsen back in 1984, recommended surgery. 
Another treating physician, Dr. Rosenberg, explained that 
Mr. Davis had serious knee problems, including ligament 
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insufficiency and cartilage tears, prior to the automobile 
accident. 
Even the chiropractic records of Appellant's brother show 
that Steven Davis had sustained injury to his knee while playing 
basketball. In addition, Appellant's wife heard Steven Davis 
complain about knee problems before the accident. 
Finally, Dr. Charles Smith testified that, at most, 
Appellant had a strain, which would have returned to a pre-existing 
condition within two or three months. (See Statement of Facts, 
Section A.) 
Clearly, the jury had a wealth of evidence upon which to 
conclude that the accident was not the proximate cause of any knee 
injury. 
(b) Evidence of pre-existing back problems 
It is clear that Appellant had major back problems prior 
to the accident, as is shown by the summary of chiropractic visits 
referenced in the Statement of Facts. 
In review, Appellant received 69 chiropractic treatments 
prior to the accident, with three (3) treatments in 1977; thirteen 
(13) treatments in 1978; twenty-eight (28) treatments in 1979; 
one(l) treatment in 1980; one (1) treatment in 1981; six (6) 
treatments in 1982; eight (8) treatments in 1983; four (4) 
treatments in 1984; three (3) treatments in 1985; one (1) treatment 
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in 1986, and one (1) treatment in 1987. 
As a result of the May 25, 1988 automobile accident, 
Steven Davis was diagnosed by his brother, Douglas Davis, as 
having: 
strain/sprain to the cervical and upper 
thoracic regions with radiculitis into the 
cervical and brachial plexus. 
Douglas Davis testified that this was a permanent 
condition and that a person would never be the same after this type 
of injury. However, it is significant to note that this exact 
diagnosis, word-for-word, was given to Steven Davis on two prior 
occasions, the first on November 11, 1978 and again on October 25, 
1979, for two different accidents. Therefore, if in fact the 
diagnosis given by his brother was accurate, then Mr. Davis had a 
permanent disability for approximately ten (10) years before the 
accident. 
The radiologist retained by the Appellant, Dr. Halverson, 
could not say with reasonable medical certainty that any of the 
findings on his CT scans related to the automobile accident. Also, 
Dr. Charles Smith, in reviewing the x-rays of Appellant's back, did 
not see anything out of the ordinary. (See Statement of Facts, 
Section B.) 
Again, there is unquestionably abundant evidence upon 
which the jury could conclude that the back problems of Appellant 
17 
were not related to the automobile accident. 
(c) Evidence of pre-existing emotional and 
psychological problems 
Ample evidence exists supporting the jury verdict in the 
instant case regarding Appellant's claimed psychological injuries. 
It is noteworthy that Appellant's own expert witnesses 
significantly disagreed with one another regarding the effect, if 
any, of the car accident upon Appellant's previously diagnosed Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder and Post Concussion Syndrome. It is 
important to note that the mere existence of expert testimony on a 
particular subject dose not compel a jury to make findings based on 
the testimony. In Dickson v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 
1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
No matter how arcane the subject matter 
or how erudite the witness, the jury is not 
required to accept the expert's testimony as 
conclusive. The jurors may give such 
testimony any weight they choose, including no 
weight at all, (emphasis added) 
Dr. Ralph Gant, Appellant's expert psychologist, admitted 
during cross-examination that the adoption problem, which pre-dated 
the instant automobile accident by several years, was the main 
source of psychological and emotional stress. Breaking down 
matters into percentages, Dr. Gant testified as follows: 
Q. Tell me how much was the adoption 
lawsuit? 
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A. That adoption process, if the head injury 
accounts for 10-40% then for the most of 
the remaining percent come to somewhere 
between 60% and 80% or 90% I would 
attribute to the lawsuit. 
Q. The adoption lawsuit? 
A. The adoption lawsuit. (R 354, pp. 641-642) 
Also, Dr. Gant admitted that there existed many sources of stress 
in Appellant's life totally unrelated to the automobile accident. 
The following is testimony of Dr. Gant in referring to an affidavit 
which he filed in a lawsuit unrelated to the instant one: 
Q. Do you recall specifically the contents 
of this affidavit? 
A. I don't recall it word for word 
counselor. 
Q. If you would take a minute and that would 
be fine with me if you would review the 
entire document carefully, and then tell 
me if there is any mention in the entire 
affidavit of the automobile accident of 
May of 1988. 
A. First of all, there is no mention of the 
automobile accident in this affidavit. 
Q. Okay, thank you. Is there no mention of 
other events other than the adoption in 
the affidavit? How about paragraph 9? 
A. In item lfG" there is reference to a 
number of stressors, his feeling of 
detachment and estrangement from others, 
leaders of his own church. 
* * * 
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Q. I just want to make sure that I am with 
you. 
A. Then moving down to item 9, I mention 
such factors as the involvement of SBA 
and FBI. 
Q. Isn't it true that you state the SBA and 
FBI inquiring into the financial status 
and whether he was totally candid with 
those institutions added to Mr. Davis' 
stress. 
A. Yes. (R 354, pp. 624-626) 
During further cross examination by Mr. Hansen, Dr. Gant 
identified even more sources of stress such as the imminence of 
Appellant losing his home, the gunshot wound and injury as a child, 
other pending lawsuits in which Appellant was involved, either as 
a Appellant or Respondent and a claim for discrimination Appellant 
had made against a professor at Utah Valley Community College. (R 
354, pp. 639-649) 
After discussing these issues, Dr. Gant gave the 
following testimony: 
Q. In fact there is just a whole host of 
stressors that compromise this man's 
life, isn't that true? 
A. There are many stressors. 
Q. And you are not even aware of all of 
them? 
A. There are many stressors that impair this 
man's life. (R 354, p. 649) 
It is interesting to note that Dr. Gant testified that 
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Appellant's childhood hunting accident where he was shot in the 
head at close range with a rifle, was in a coma for days, and 
required a metal plate to be placed in his skull, caused no long 
term psychological problems, or damages to Appellant; yet, the 
instant automobile accident in which Appellant did not even receive 
any hospital treatment, caused significant psychological problems 
which would last Appellant a lifetime. (R 354, p. 646) 
Appellant's expert neuropsychologist, Dr. Linda Gummow, 
had some significant disagreements with Dr. Gant. Regarding the 
Post Concussion Syndrome, Dr. Gummow testified that she couldn't 
say with any degree of medical certainty whether Appellant had even 
suffered a concussion in the instant automobile accident. (R 354, 
p. 722) 
Secondly, Dr. Gummow testified that even assuming if he 
had suffered a concussion in the automobile accident, any symptoms 
or problems related to the concussion were non-existent as of the 
date she examined the Appellant: 
Q. This is significant language. There is 
no evidence that Mr. Davis' cognitive 
profile was adversely affected by the 
motor vehicle accident and by cognitive 
profile you mean what? 
A. His profile of intellectual abilities. I 
compared them before and after and there 
was no change. 
Q. The automobile accident had nothing to do 
with any change in his intellectual 
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abilities? 
A. As far as I could determine, no change. 
Q. Although Mr. Davis may have suffered a 
concussion and now we are on page 10, a 
concussion as a result of the motor 
vehicle accident in Provo Canyon, any 
residuals from the impact had been 
resolved by the time [of] the evaluation. 
So when you saw him if he had a problem 
it had been cleared up by the time you 
saw him? 
A. Yes. About 9% of this type of injury 
clears within two (2) years and that is 
what happened in this case. (R 354, pp. 
719-720) 
Regarding the diagnosed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
Dr. Gummow testified that the effect of the car accident on this 
condition was insignificant to mild. Regarding this issue, Dr. 
Gummow testified: 
Q. And as I understand that emotional 
problem, when we took your deposition 
stems from an inability to go out and 
exercise so he did have stress release, 
is that the basis for that? 
A. Right, the headaches, not being able to 
have stress release and those things can 
be life limiting. 
Q. What is it that he couldn't to physically 
as far as to have those stress releasors? 
A. Exercise. 
Q. Primarily jogging? 
A. Jogging and walking, things like that. 
They used to make him feel better he 
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said. 
Q. And you don't know whether or not the 
automobile accident would have been a 
basis for him not being able to jog do 
you? 
A. No, only through his report that he had 
the knee injuries. That would be out of 
my area of expertise given what he told 
me was accurate that his knee injury 
prevented him from doing that and that is 
the basis for my comment. (R 354, pp. 
720-721) 
Based on the evidence concerning Appellant's pre-existing 
problems with his knees, it is clear the jury concluded that if Mr. 
Davis had any emotional problems from being unable to exercise, 
this condition was not a result of the automobile accident. 
Respondents also called Dr. Michael Lambert, 
psychologist, as a witness regarding Appellant's alleged 
psychological injuries. Dr. Lambert was not retained by counsel 
for either Respondents, but was hired by the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services of the State of Utah to do a psychological 
evaluation of Appellant and make recommendations to the State about 
his suitability to receive vocational rehabilitation funding. (R 
354, pp. 814-815) 
After examining and testing Appellant, it was Dr. 
Lambert's opinion that Appellant was exaggerating his psychological 
symptoms for financial gain: 
Q. Dr. Lambert, I would like for you,if you 
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would, now to read a portion of that 
report. We are talking now on the second 
page. I will call it the third full 
paragraph down, or the second paragraph 
under Personality Integration. 
A. MMPI results suggested that Mr. Davis is 
exaggerating his psychological symptoms. 
His "F" scores were extremely high. Even 
though he was well oriented and reads 
well, Mr. Davis took a long time to 
complete this test. His scores are not 
consistent with his interview and life 
adjustment is reasonable to conclude that 
the results suggesting serious 
psychopathology must be questioned. 
Given his current legal dilemma it may be 
that he has something to gain from 
appearing more disturbed than he is. (R 
354, pp. 815-816) 
Summarizing the evidence in the instant case regarding 
Appellants alleged psychological injuries, it is apparent that 
there existed some serious discrepancies between Appellant's own 
experts. Although Dr. Gant testified that the accident caused Post 
Concussion Syndrome and aggravated a pre-existing Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder, the neuropsychologist, Dr. Linda Gummow, testified 
that there existed no basis for attributing Post Concussion 
Syndrome to the accident. Further, considering Dr. Gummow's 
testimony regarding aggravation of the pre-existing Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder in light of testimony given by Jerold Greenwood, 
Jeannie Greenwood and Dr. Gary Larsen, it is clear that Dr. 
Gummow's opinion was based upon false information supplied to her 
by Appellant. This, standing alone, gives the jury ample basis to 
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conclude that the automobile accident had no causal relationship to 
any of Appellant's claimed psychological injuries; however, the 
jury had additional evidence to consider. Dr. Michael Lambert 
expressed his opinion to the jury that Mr. Davis was simply 
exaggerating his symptoms for financial gain. 
(d) Evidence of pre-existing TMJ Problems 
The record in the instant case is replete with evidence 
supporting the jury verdict regarding Appellant's alleged TMJ 
injuries. During cross-examination, Appellant's expert dentist, 
Dr. Keith Whatcott, admitted that he performed a limited 
examination. 
Q. No other than taking a medical history, 
what diagnostic tests or procedures did 
you undergo with Mr. Davis? 
A. We did muscle testing. 
Q. And how was that done? 
A. That was done by palpating or massaging 
some of the muscles of the head, face and 
neck from inside the mouth as well as on 
the outside that is pretty diagnostic. 
Q. Okay, and anything else at that time? 
Have you done anything else with Dr. 
Davis in an effort to diagnosis his 
problem? 
A. Well, like I say, I observed how he 
opened and closed his jaw. We observed 
how wide he could open his mouth. At 
that point, I mean, I have not been asked 
to do any more than just that. I have 
not done any extensive testing at this 
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point. That is correct. 
Q. So you haven't actually placed Mr. Davis 
on any diagnostic equipment? 
A. Correct, I have not. 
Q. Didn't take any x-rays? 
A No sir. (R 354, p. 316) 
Respondents' expert oral surgeon, Dr. Crayton Walker, 
attributed Appellant's TMJ problems to many years of bruxism or 
teeth grinding. 
Q. Dr. Walker, is there any way to tell 
based on your examination of the wear 
patterns of the teeth, is there any way 
to tell how old those wear patterns are. 
A. Well -
Q. How long the teeth grinding has been 
going on? 
A. No way to exactly tell. He had 
significant wear patterns on his teeth 
and it has been going on for an extended 
time probably most of his adult life. (R 
354, p. 569) 
* * • 
Q. So, Dr., do you have an opinion as to 
whether any of Mr. Davis' conditions with 
regard to TMJ had an causal connection 
with the automobile accident? 
A. My opinion is based upon what he told me 
at the time and further what I have seen 
from these photographs and whatever 
today, that I don't think the automobile 
accident significantly caused his TMJ. I 
think it is much more likely that his 
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problems with his jaw joint were caused 
as a result of his long-standing 
grinding, clinching of his teeth and 
muscle spasm as well as some malocclusion 
of his teeth. (R 354, pp. 580-581) 
Dr. Walker testified that he was familiar with Dr. 
Whatcott's report and that the examination which Dr. Whatcott 
performed was insufficient to allow Dr. Whatcott to render a 
medical opinion as to whether Appellant even suffered a TMJ 
problem. 
Q. In your opinion, did Dr. Whatcott perform 
the necessary tests and diagnostic 
procedures to be able to render a medical 
opinion as to whether Mr. Davis was 
suffering from TMJ? 
A. I would say no. (R 354, p. 581) 
Considering as a whole the evidence submitted to the jury 
regarding Appellant's alleged TMJ injuries, it is clear that a 
strong evidentiary basis supporting the jury's verdict exists. It 
is apparent from the jury's verdict that the jury simply decided to 
believe the testimony offered by Dr. Crayton Walker and discard 
that of Dr. Whatcott. This is certainly the jury's prerogative and 
the evidence supports the jury's decision. See Onyeabor v. Pro 
Roofing, Inc.. 787 P.2d 525, 529-530 (Utah App. 1990), where 
polarized expert testimony was rendered during a jury trial 
regarding whether plaintiff had suffered a closed-head injury. The 
jury's award showed that the jury believed the defense witness and 
27 
did not believe the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses. The Court 
of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion 
for new trial reasoning that to do so would be invading the 
province of the jury. 
It should also be noted that Appellant was less than 
candid throughout the course of the litigation and during the 
trial. The specific references would be too numerous to list. 
However, by way of illustration, Steven Davis failed to identify in 
his answers to interrogatories that he had been treated for prior 
knee problems; ( R 354, pp. 214-218, 299) he failed to disclose to 
his treating physician the true nature of his injuries (R 354, p. 
424) and he personally "augmented," without the knowledge of his 
brother, an insurance form to receive "extra stuff like crutches." 
(R 354, pp. 545-546) There is no doubt this lack of candor was 
reflected in the jury verdict. 
In sum, there was clearly sufficient evidence to support 
the verdict. Appellant's challenge to the verdict on the ground of 
insufficient evidence should be rejected. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The trial court "is not free to grant a new trial merely 
because it disagrees with the judgment of the jury. A new trial 
may properly be granted only when the jury's verdict is Manifestly 
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against the weight of the evidence."1 Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 
530, 532 (Utah 1984). Further, if evidence was submitted to the 
jury that could have supported the jury's verdict, the verdict 
should not be disturbed. Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rawlins, 
Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986). 
In Pollesche v. Transamerican Insurance Co. , 497 P.2d 236 
(Utah 1972), the Utah Supreme Court in reviewing a trial court's 
decision denying plaintiff a new trial based on insufficiency of 
the evidence, stated the following: 
In the Instant action, the jury was 
required to weigh the conflicting evidence and 
the credibility of the witnesses and to 
determine the questions of fact thus presented 
as well as the ultimate fact of negligence. 
In view of the substantially conflicting 
evidence and the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, fair-minded men might reasonably 
entertain different conclusions; therefore, 
this court cannot hold that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial. 
Pollesche, at 236. 
In this matter, as set forth in detail in Point I of this 
Brief, there was clearly evidence that supported the verdict. The 
fact that Appellant disputed the evidence is irrelevant to this 
appeal. Appellant has not carried his burden to marshall the 
evidence and should not be granted a new trial because of the 
overwhelming evidence which supported the verdict. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant's challenge to the jury's factual 
determinations have no basis in law. Ample evidence supported the 
verdict and Appellant has failed to marshall all evidence that 
supported the verdict, and then demonstrate that the supporting 
evidence was insufficient. 
This Court should affirm the verdict and the trial 
court's denial of Appellant's motion for new trial. Appellees 
should also be awarded their costs in this appeal. 
DATED this 'o day of March, 1993. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By:. 
William J, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Porter 
DATED this /o day of March, 1993. 
SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Pearce 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Weenig 
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Service, this / Q day of March, 1993, to: 
Richard C. Coxon 
Attorney at Law 
275 North Main 
P.O. Box 288 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
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CHIROPRACTIC TREATMENT OF STEVEN C. DAVIS 





Rodney C. Davis 
Rodney C. Davis 
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Rodney C. Davis 
Rodney C. Davis 
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History, Exam, Spinal Manipulation, 
Diagnosis; sprain of the lumbar spine, 8470 L, 7251-




Initial office visit, history and exam; injured 
while lifting boxes from garage to basement 
Diagnosis; severe sprain/strain to cervical and upper 












































































Spinal Manipulation, Traction Therapy 
















Spinal Manipulation, Traction Therapy 
History, Exam, Spinal Manipulation, x-rays R.S.;A-P & 
Lat, Orthopedic Support; Traction Therapy Ultra Sound -
Injured back while moving cases and boxes at the 
University on 09-24-79 




















































Spinal Manipulation, Traction Therapy, Ultra Sound 
Spinal Manipulation, Traction Therapy, Ultra Sound 
Traction Therapy, Ultra Sound 
Traction Therapy, Ultra Sound 
Traction Therapy, Ultra Sound 




















Ultra Sound Traction Therapy, 
Physical Therapy, Ultra Sound 
Traction Therapy. Diagnosis: severe sprain/strain 
to the thoracic and lower lumbar regions with radiculitis 
into lumbar plexus 
198G 
L980 No Recorded Treatments 
1981 



































Douglas R. Davis 
Douglas R. Davis 
Rodney C, Davis 
Rodney C. Davis 
Douglas R. Davis 
Douglas R. Davis 
Douglas R. Davis 
Douglas R. Davis 
Spinal Manipulation 
Spinal Manipulation 
History, Exam, Spinal Manipulation, 
Therapy, Lumbar support, Orthotics, 
while working in yard on 05-24-83 












Douglas R. Davis 
Douglas R. Davis 
Douglas R. Davis 









Rodney C. Davis 
Rodney C. Davis 
Rodney C. Davis 
Spinal Manipulation, Ultra Sound 
Spinal Manipulation 
Spinal Manipulation, Ultra Sound 
198< 
03-25-86 Rodney C. Davis Spinal Manipulation 
198" 
1987 No Recorded Treatments 
198* 
DATE OF ACCIDENT, MAY 25, 1988 

















































Limited Exam, Chiropractic, Ultra Sound, Full Spine, X-
rays, AP & LAT, Cervical AP & LAT - 2 vies, cold packs, 
blue ice, orthopedic support, heel lift, Spinal Manipu-
lation; Diagnosis: Severe sprain/strain to the cervical 
and upper thoracic regions with radiculitis into the 
cervical and brachial plexus 
Chiropractic OV/Spinal Manipulation, Ultra Sound, 
Mechanical Traction, Infrared heating pad 
Chiropractic OV/Spinal Manipulation, Ultra Sound, 
Mechanical Traction 
Chiropractic OV/Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction 
History, Exam, Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction, 





























































































































































































Ultra So nd 
Ultra Sou id 
Ultra Soui d 
Ultra Soi: id 
Ultra Sotr d 
Ultra So md 
Ultra Soui d 
Ultra Son id 
Ultra Soui d 
Ultra Soui d 
Ultra Soi nd 
Ultra So md 
Ultra So\ nd 
Ultra Sou d 










































































Mechanical Traction, Ultra Soui i 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra Sou d 
IS, Ultra Sound 
IS, Ultra Sound 
Mechanical Traction. Ultra Son d 
TM, Chiropractic table, OV/Spii il 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra Sou d 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra Soui d 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra Sou d 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra Soui 1 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra Sou d 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra SOUT i 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra Sou d 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra Soui i 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra Sou d 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra Soui i 
Mechanical Traction. Ultra Son d 
, Continued) 
11-23-90 Rodney C. Davis 
12-04-90 Rodney C. Davis 
12-21-90 Rodney C. Davis 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction, Ultra Scund 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction. Ultra S< und 







































































































































, Ultra l ound 
Ultra S >und 
Ultra S< und 
Ultra S< ind 
Ultra Sc und 
Ultra Sc md 
nitra S< und 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction 
TM Lift, Spinal Manipulation. Ultra Sound 













md Mechanical Traction, 
Mechanical Traction, IItra Sc md 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra S< und 
Inferential Traction, Ultra S mnd 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra So md 
Mechinical Traction, Ultra S< und 
Mechanical Traction, Ultra So tnd 
Inferential Traction, Ultra Sound 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction, Ultra So md 
Re-exam, Spinal Manipulation, Heel Lift 
Spinal Manipulation, TM Lift 
Spinal Manipulation, TM lift, Detailed Spine and I nee 
Examination and Analysis 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction. Ultra Sc und 
Spinal Manipulation, TM 
Spinal Manipulation. Mechanical Traction, Ultra Sc und 
Spinal Manipulation 
Spinal Manipulation, Ultra Sound 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction, 1ltra Sc md 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction, Ultra Sc und 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction, Ultra S >und 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction, Ultra Sc und 
Chiropractic Exam, Review CT Scan Report, Spinal 
Manipulation, Mechanical Traction, Ultra Sound, 
Detailed Spine and Knee Exam 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction, Ultra S< und 
Spinal Manipulation, Mecnanical Traction, Ultra Sound 
Spinal Manipulation, Ultra Sound 
Neurologist EMG, CT-Scan Brain, EEC Blood Test result 
Diagnosis, Spinal Manipulation, Chiropractic Complete 
Spinal Manipulation, Mechanical Traction 
Tab 2 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, Slate of Utah 
CARMA 8. Sf^TH. Clerk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN C. DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KARL N. WEENIG and JOHN P. 
PORTER, 
Defendants. 
| SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 900400541CV 
i Judge Boyd L. Park 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of 
the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of 
the issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is so 
equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the 
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against 
the issue presented, answer "No." Also, any damages assessed must 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find 
that the defendant, Karl Weenig, was negligent in performing any 
one or more of the specific acts of negligence alleged by the 
plaintiff. * 
ANSWER; Yes V No 
2. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find 
that the negligence of the defendant, Karl Weenig, was a proximate 
cause of the injuries claimed by plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes No T 
3. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find 
that the defendant, John P. Porter, was negligent in performing any 
one or more of the specific acts of negligence alleged by the 
plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes V No 
4. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find 
that the negligence of the defendant, John P. Porter, was a 
proximate cause of the injuries claim^rf by plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes No 
ime/rf
5. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find 
that the plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, was negligent in performing 
any one or more of the specific acts of negligence alleged by the 
defendants? 
ANSWER: Yes No / 
6. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find 
that the negligence of the plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, was a 
proximate cause of the injuries claimed by plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
Li c
7. If you have answered any or all of the Questions 2, 4, 
and 6 "Yes," then, and only then answer the following question: 
Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to total 100%, what 
percentage of that negligence is attributable to : 
A. Defendant, Karl Weenig % 
B. Defendant, John P. Porter % 
C. Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis % 
TOTAL 100% 
8. If you have answered either or both Questions 2 and 4 
"Yes," state the amount of special and general damages, if any, 
sustained by the plaintiff. If neither questions were answered 
"Yes," do not answer this question. 
Special Damages: $ 
General Damages: $ 
TOTAL $ 




William J. Hansen, #1353 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Porter 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
Brett G. Pearce, Esq. 
SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendant Weenig 
1018 Atherton Plaza 
Suite B 202 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
Telephone: (801) 264-5263 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN C. DAVIS, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 




i Civil No. 900400541CV 
i Judge Boyd Park 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for hearing 
in the above-entitled court before the Honorable Boyd Park on April 
27, 1992. The plaintiff appeared through counsel Arthur Lee Bishop 
and Darwin C. Fisher, defendant Weenig through counsel Brett G. 
Pearce, and defendant Porter through counsel William J. Hansen. A 
jury was impaneled. Evidence was introduced, the jury instructed 
and the matter being fully argued, the case was submitted to the 
jury which upon due deliberation, returned and made the following: 
r L cs -
4TH DIS7m3~ CCJTT 
S7\7r r r ! 7;..i 
k 6 2 ii P» '92 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action find from a 
preponderance of evidence the answers to the interrogatories or 
questions propounded to us as follows: 
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find that the defendant Karl Weenig was negligent in performing any 
one or more of the specific acts of negligence alleged by the 
plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
2. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find that the negligence of the defendant Karl Weenig was a 
proximate cause of the injuries of plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
3. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find that the defendant John P. Porter was negligent in performing 
any one or more of the specific acts of negligence alleged by the 
plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
4. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find that the negligence of the defendant John P. Porter was a 
proximate cause of the injuries of plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
5. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
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find that the negligence of the plaintiff Steven C. Davis was a 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER; Yes No X 
6. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find that the negligence of the plaintiff Steven C. Davis was a 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
7. If you have answered any or all of the Questions 2, 
4, and 6 "Yes," then, and only then, answer the following question: 
Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to total 100%, what 
percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
A. Defendant Karl Weenig % 
B. Defendant John P. Porter % 
C. Plaintiff Steven C. Davis % 
TOTAL 100% 
8. If you have answered either or both Questions 2 and 
4 "Yes," state the amount of special and general damages, if any, 
sustained by the plaintiff. If neither questions were answered 
"Yes," do not answer this question. 
Special Damages: $ 
General Damages: $ 
TOTAL $ 
WHEREFORE, upon motion of the defendants, and good cause 
-3-
appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the 
defendants have judgment against the plaintiff on his complaint of 
^_ no cause of action and the defendants are awarded their costs of 
^ ' court in the sum of $Z, 300. 30", as is reflected by the Memorandum of 
Costs and Disbursements which has been filed with the Court. 
DATED this Jb day of '±£*,f*f , 1992. 
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BY THB7€£)UR ^ r 
'^L ^5Lfl 
feOYD f.. PARK, d i s t r i c t J u d g e 
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APPROVED AS TO FOJRM: 
/• 
Arthur LeeBrSnopT/Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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This is to certify that a triie and correct copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENT was sent—b^ Lhe U.Si—POSt&l Servrce-7—postage 
prppaid, this Q day of May, 1992, to: 
Arthur %ee l&shop, Esq. 
The Thomas/Jefferson Mansion 
141 East^&eoo South, Suite 200 
Salt Lak£ City, UT 84107 
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq. 
NIELSEN, HILL & FISHER 
3319 North University, #200 
Provo, UT 84 604 
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Tab 4 
William J. Hansen, #A1353 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Defendant Porter 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN C. DAVIS, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
KARL N. WEENIG and JOHN P. ] 
PORTER, J 
Defendants. ] 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
I NEW TRIAL 
I Civil No. 900400541 
I Judge Park 
Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial came on for hearing 
pursuant to notice on the 25th day of June, 1992, before the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park. William J. Hansen appeared on behalf of 
defendant John P. Porter and Brett G. Pearce on behalf of Defendant 
Karl J. Weenig. Plaintiff was represented by Arthur Lee Bishop and 
Darwin C. Fisher. 
The court having considered the submitted written 
memoranda and respective oral arguments of the parties and being 
fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial is denied. 
-l-
DATED this / if day of ^ c, W , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
-L-
BOYD L. PARK, District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL was sent 
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1018 Athsrton Plaza 
Suite B 202 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
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